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Abstract
Governments in EMDEs routinely intervene in agriculture markets to stabilize food
prices in the wake of adverse domestic or external shocks. Such interventions typ-
ically involve a large increase in the procurement and redistribution of food, which
we call a redistributive policy shock. What is the impact of a redistributive policy
shock on the sectoral and aggregate dynamics of ination, and the distribution of con-
sumption amongst rich and poor households? To address this, we build a tractable
two-sector (agriculture and manufacturing) two-agent (rich and poor) New Keynesian
DSGE model with redistributive policy shocks. We calibrate the model to the Indian
economy. We show that for an ination targeting central bank, consumer heterogeneity
matters for whether monetary policy responses to a variety of shocks raises aggregate
welfare or not. Our paper contributes to a growing literature on understanding the
role of consumer heterogeneity in monetary policy.
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1 Introduction
Governments in many emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs) routinely in-
tervene in their agricultural markets. Higher food security norms, for instance, require an
increase in the redistribution of agricultural output to the poorest population in a country.
Other interventions involve the procurement and redistribution of food to minimize food price
volatility in the wake of domestic (e.g., poor rainfall) or external (e.g., global commodity
price) shocks.
There are many examples of these types of interventions. In 2013, India enacted a new
National Food Security Act (NFSA) under the umbrella of a new "rights-based" approach
to food security. The Act legally entitles "up to 75% of the rural population and 50% of
the urban population to receive subsidized food grains" under a Targeted Public Distribu-
tion System.1 Under the new act, about two thirds of the population is covered to receive
highly subsidized food grains. The ostensible goal is to smooth the purchasing power of poor
populations that are food insecure. In the Philippines, the National Food Authority (NFA)
is mandated to purchase and distribute rice and other commodities across the country In
response to the rise in world prices of grains in the last quarter of 2007, the Philippines
government provided higher funding support to implement its Economic Resiliency Program
part of which involved scaling up a rice production enhancement program called "Ginintuang
Masaganang Ani". The total scal cost of the NFA rice subsidy jumped to 0.6% of GDP in
2008 compared to 0.08% per cent of GDP in 2007 (Balisacan et al, 2010). In Bangladesh,
the government has intervened in food markets for several years in order to reduce price uc-
tuations and procure rice for safety net programs (Hossain and Deb, 2010). To ensure food
security in Indonesia in 2008, the Indonesian government, through its BULOG operational
strategy doubled the amount of rice distributed to cover all poor families under the RASKIN
program through targeted market operations requested by local governments. Regular rice
distribution for the poor was achieved by increasing domestic rice procurement. BULOGs
heavy procurement added to demand, helping farmers maintain prices at a protable level
(Saifullah, 2010). The Korean government also motivates its agricultural policy for food
security reasons based on self-su¢ciency (Beghin et al., 2003).
Interventions such as the enactment of a new national food security act with wider
coverage, or government intervention when there are large price shocks in food commodities
such as the world rice price crisis of 2008, have two salient features. First, they typically imply
higher procurement and redistribution of food commodities by the government to households.
Second, such interventions are conducted at a relatively high frequency, i.e., several times
1See https://dfpd.gov.in/nfsa-act.htm
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within a year. We refer to frequent interventions by the government in agriculture markets
as redistributive policy shocks. The main research questions that this paper addresses is:
how should monetary policy respond to redistributive policy shocks ? What is the impact
of redistributive policy shocks on the sectoral and aggregate dynamics of ination and rich
and poor consumption ? The novel part of our analysis is that we allow for government
intervention in the agriculture market in a way that captures the essence of procurement
and redistribution style interventions in EMDEs.
We build a two-sector (agriculture and manufacturing) two agent (rich and poor) New
Keynesian DSGE model. Our theoretical model builds on earlier work by Debortoli and
Gali (2018), Aoki (2001), and Ghate, Gupta and Mallick (2018). The main methodological
contribution of our framework is that we extend the two agent New Keynesian, i.e., TANK
DSGE framework of Debortoli and Gali to two sectors (agriculture and manufacturing) in a
tractable way. On the production side, the agriculture sector is perfectly competitive with
exible prices while the manufacturing sector is characterized by monopolistic competition
and sticky prices. As in Debortoli and Gali, we assume that there are two types of agents,
rich and poor. Rich agents are Ricardian and buy one period risk free bonds. Poor agents are
assumed to be rule of thumb consumers. Both rich and poor households consume both the
agriculture good and the manufacturing good. To provide the subsidized agriculture good
to the poor, the government taxes the rich via lump sum taxes and uses the proceeds to
procure agricultural output from the open market. It then re-distributes a fraction of the
procured agriculture good to the poor. Further, we assume that rich agents have a higher
inter-temporal elasticity of substitution of consumption compared to the poor which a¤ects
their labor supply decisions di¤erentially in response to changes in the real wage.2
We calibrate the model to India, an economy subject to frequent government interven-
tions in the agriculture market.3 From the impulse response functions (IRFs), we focus our
attention on how the transmission of agricultural productivity shocks, redistributive policy
shocks, and monetary policy shocks a¤ect sectoral ination rates, the economy wide ina-
tion rate, and consumption of rich and poor agents. We compare our results to a variety of
benchmarks that emerge as special cases from our framework: a two sector representative
agent NK framework along the lines of Aoki, a one sector two agent NK DSGE model along
2In Debortoli and Gali, all agents have the same inter-temporal elasticity of substitution. Our assumption
is driven by evidence for Indian household data that estimates di¤erent inter-temporal elasticity of substitu-
tion parameters for rich and poor households. See Atkeson and Ogaki (1996). Our assumption is also in line
with some of the DSGE literature on the macroeconomic evaluation of LSAPs (large scale asset purchase
programs), where the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution across households is assumed to be di¤erent.
See Chen, Curdia, and Ferrero (2012).
3We calibrate the model to India since it is an EMDE with a large agriculture sector and many parameter
values are available for India.
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the lines of Debortoli and Gali, and the simple one sector one agent NK model in Gali (2015,
Chapter 3).4 By comparing our results to these benchmarks, we are able to highlight the role
that consumer heterogeneity (demand side factors) and multiple sectors (supply side factors)
play in determining sectoral and aggregate ination rates, and rich and poor consumption,
when the economy is hit by a redistributive policy shock.
We show that a positive agricultural productivity shock leads to a decline in ination, a
rise in the output gap, a rise in both poor and rich consumption, and higher welfare. We
dene welfare in the model to explicitly depend on aggregate consumption, as is standard in
the literature. In contrast, a procurement and redistribution shock leads to higher ination,
a higher output gap, higher consumption of the poor and higher aggregate consumption in
the economy, even though such shocks raise ination, and there is a decline in consumption
of the rich. Because of the redistributive e¤ect of procurement and redistribution, the rise
in poor consumption makes aggregate welfare rise. Compared to the Aoki model, since
the poor receive a fraction of their agriculture consumption for free (via the redistributive
shock) and spend a higher share of their income on the agriculture good compared to the
rich, the market demand for the agriculture good is less, and so the inationary impact of
a procurement-and-redistribution shock is much lower in our model compared to the Aoki
model (where there is no redistribution).
A recent focus in the monetary policy literature explores the impact of monetary policy
when there is consumer heterogeneity. As in this research, we ask how heterogeneity mat-
ters for whether monetary policy responses to shocks raise aggregate welfare or not? Why
is it important to take into account heterogeneity? In our model consumer heterogeneity
interacts with rich inter-sectoral dynamics to determine the di¤erential response that rich
and poor consumption, and therefore aggregate demand, has to shocks. We therefore com-
pare our two sector TANK model under a contractionary monetary policy shock with the
simple NK framework in Gali (2015, Chapter 3), the Aoki model, and Debortoli and Gali.
In models with two sectors (our model and Aokis) the presence of a exible price sector in
our model creates a large deation in the economy because of the contractionary monetary
policy. This is because a rise in the nominal interest rate leads to the inter-temporal substi-
tution of consumption, as in the standard NK model, which causes a reduction in aggregate
demand and a decline in the aggregate price level and ination. This decline becomes more
pronounced when there is a exible price sector in addition to a sticky price sector. Since the
4Both productivity shock and procurement and redistributive shock IRFs are benchmarked only to the
Aoki model since Aoki has two production sectors while both Debortoli and Gali and Gali (2015, Chapter 3)
have a single sticky price manufacturing sector. In the case of Debortoli and Gali, their framework assumes
incomplete markets, ours has complete markets. Parameter restrictions that yield their model can therefore
be seen as an approximation of their framework.
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shock is of one period, agricultural ination returns to the steady state in the next period.
Manufacturing ination, however, recovers, gradually, because of the sticky price assumption
in all models. Crucially, in our model and Aokis model, real interest rates increase by less,
and therefore rich and poor consumption falls be less compared to Debortoli and Gali and
the simple NK model. The decline in aggregate consumption, therefore, is also less in our
model and Aokis model compared to the simple NK model and Debortoli and Gali. As a
result, the welfare losses from monetary policy shocks are less when there is a exible price
sector. In all cases, consumer heterogeneity interacts with rich inter-sectoral dynamics to
determine the general equilibrium responses to a variety of shocks.
Our two sector-two agent NK framework builds on the seminal work by Gali andMonacelli
(2005), Aoki (2001), and Debortoli and Gali (2018). The main di¤erence with respect to
papers is that Gali and Monacelli (2005) consider an open economy framework, whereas we
consider a closed economy framework. In Aoki (2001) there are two production sectors, a
exible agriculture sector that is perfectly competitive, and a sticky price manufacturing
sector that is monopolistically competitive. The production side of our model is similar
to Aokis model. However, Aokis model has a single representative agent. In our model,
we allow for two types of agents, rich (Ricardian) and poor (rule of thumb) with di¤erent
inter-temporal elasticities of substitution in consumption and di¤erent budget constraints.
Another di¤erence with respect to Aoki (2001) is that the government in our model taxes
rich agents, procures grain from the agriculture sector, and provides lump sum transfers to
poor agents. In Aokis framework there is no government intervention.5
Debortoli and Gali (2018) build a DSGE model in which agents are Ricardian/rich and
rule of thumb/poor. They show that a tractable TANK model provides a good approxi-
mation to study the impact of aggregate shocks to aggregate variables in a baseline HANK
(Heterogenous agent New Keynesian) model. In Debortoli and Gali (2018), there is however
only one production sector (sticky price sector). The main methodological contribution of
our paper is to extend the two agent-one sector framework of Debortoli and Gali to two
sectors in a tractable way.
Our paper also builds on previous work in Ghate, Gupta, Mallick (2018), or GGM. In
GGM, there are three production sectors (grain, vegetables, and manufacturing). In that
framework, all three sectors are monopolistically competitive, with the agriculture sector
having exible prices. The manufacturing sector is the sticky price sector. In the current
framework, there are two production sectors (agriculture, manufacturing). Unlike GGM, the
agriculture sector is just characterized by a grain sector which is assumed to be perfectly
5Gali, Lopez-Salido, and Valles (2007) use a two agent framework (rule of thumb and Ricardian) to
account for evidence on government spending shocks, but their focus is on scal policy, not monetary policy.
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competitive. Like GGM, the manufacturing sector is the sticky price sector. In GGM, there
is a single representative agent, i.e., it is a RANK (Representative Agent New Keynesian)
model. Our model has two types of agents.6 Like GGM however, our model illustrates
how the terms of trade between agriculture and manufacturing plays a crucial role in the
transmission of monetary policy changes to aggregate outcomes.
Our paper builds on a growing literature on heterogenous agent New Keynesian (HANK)
models (McKay, Nakamura, and Steinsson, 2016; Kaplan, Moll, and Violante, 2018; Auclert,
2019, and Broer et al., 2019). The main methodological contribution our paper makes is to
merge a two sector production structure along the lines of Aoki with a TANK framework
along the lines of Debortoli and Gali to understand the impact of redistributive policy shocks
and its implications for monetary policy using a tractable New Keynesian DSGE framework.
2 The Model
The model has two sectors: agriculture (A) and manufacturing (M). The A-sector is charac-
terized by perfect competition and exible prices, and produces a single homogenous good.
TheM -sector is characterized by monopolistic competition and staggered price setting.7 We
assume that there are two types of households: poor (P ) and rich (R). The fraction of
households which are rich is exogenously given and denoted by R. The rest (1   R) are
poor. The poor and rich can either work in the A sector or the M sector. Poor households
are assumed to be rule of thumb (or hand to mouth consumers) and do not have bond hold-
ings. Rich households are forward-looking Ricardian consumers and hold bonds. The rich
households own the rms and also supply labor to their own rms, and so they have both
dividend and labor income. The poor households only supply labor to the rms owned by
the rich, and so their only income is labor income. This implies that the total number of
rms equals the sum of rich and poor households.
Like GGM, the government procures grain in the open market. It does this by taxing
(lump-sum) the rich and uses the proceeds to procure/buy A-sector output from the market
at the market price.8 It then redistributes a fraction of the procured A good to poor house-
holds. Hence redistribution goes to the poor households, rather than any particular sector.
The rich households also have higher incomes than the poor since the poor households only
6In the current framework, we do not model minimum support prices as we did in GGM. Our focus is
on the impact of redistributive policy shocks on rich-poor consumption and sectoral and aggregate ination
dynamics, and monetary policy setting in this context.
7The manufacturing sector can also be termed as the "non-agriculture" sector. The names are not crucial.
What is crucial is that one sector is a exible price sector, and the other is a sticky price sector.
8It is important to note that the seller of the A good can be either poor or rich.
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have labor income, whereas rich households have labor and dividend income.
Following Atkeson and Ogaki (1996), we assume that poor and rich households have
di¤erent inter-temporal elasticities of substitution. In particular, we assume that the poor
have a lower inter-temporal elasticity of substitution than the rich, which means that they
are less willing to substitute consumption across time periods. This allows labor responses
of the rich and poor to di¤er for a given change in the real wage (see Chen, Curdia, and
Ferrero, 2012).
2.1 Households
All households are assumed to have identical preferences.9 At time 0, a household of type
K (= R, P ) maximizes its expected lifetime utility given by
E0
1X
t=0
t [U (CK;t)  V (NK;t)] (1)
where CK;t is a consumption index, and NK;t is labor supply. The subscriptK 2 fR;Pg spec-
ies the household type. A household of type K 2 fR;Pg derives utility from consumption,
CK;t; and disutility from labor supply, NK;t:  2 (0; 1) is the discount factor. The period
utility function is specied as
U (CK;t) =
C1 KK;t
1  K
(2)
V (NK;t) =
N1+'K;t
1 + '
(3)
where K and ', respectively, are the inverse of the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution
for consumer type K, and the inverse of the Frisch labor supply elasticity, which is assumed
to be the same for both types of households. Consumption of both rich and poor households
depend on goods consumed from both sectors and follow Cobb-Douglas indices of agriculture
(A) and manufacturing (M) consumption and is given by
CK;t =
CKK;A;tC
1 K
K;M;t
KK (1  K)
1 K
; for K = R and P . (4)
where R 2 [0; 1] is the share of income spent on agricultural goods by the rich while P 2
[0; 1] is the share of income spent on agricultural goods by the poor.
9All derivations for the model in Section 2 and 3 are in the Technical Appendix.
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Rich households maximize utility given in equation (1) subject to the following inter-
temporal budget constraint
1Z
0
[PM;t(j)CR;M;t(j)] dj + PA;tCR;A;t + EtfQt+1Bt+1g  Bt +WtNR;t   TR;t +Divt (5)
where Qt+1 is the stochastic discount factor, Bt+1 are the nominal payo¤s in period t + 1
of the bond held at the end of period t; TR;t is the lump-sum tax paid to the government,
and Divt is the dividend income distributed to households by monopolistically competitive
rms: Labor is assumed to be completely mobile across sectors, with the nominal wage rate
given by Wt: We assume that the A sector produces a single homogenous good, whose price
is PA;t. Consumption in the manufacturing sector is a CES aggregate of a continuum of
di¤erentiated goods indexed by j 2 [0; 1];where PM;t(j) is the price level of the jth variety of
the M -sector good, i.e.,10
CM;t =
0@ 1Z
0
CM;t (j)
" 1
" dj
1A
"
" 1
; " > 1:
To model a procurement-redistribution style intervention in an EMDE, the government
in every period procures the agriculture good at the open market price, PA;t. Part of the
procured agriculture good is rebated back to poor to each household as a subsidy, CSP;A;t;
while the remaining portion is put into a bu¤er stock.11 Of the total consumption of the
agriculture good by the poor household, CP;A;t; a fraction, t; is subsidized (it is given for
free). That is, CSP;A;t = tCP;A;t The remaining fraction, (1  t) of CP;A;t is purchased from
the open market (COP;A;t) and
CSP;A;t + C
O
P;A;t = CP;A;t: (6)
Poor households are assumed to be rule of thumb consumers, and maximize their current
10The demand functions for goods within manufacturing varieties are
CK;M;t(j) =

PM;t(j)
PM;t
 "
CK;M;t
for K = R and P .
11An equivalent interpretation is that non-redistributed procured output is wasted, or "thrown into the
ocean." We do not endogenize bu¤er stock dynamics in this paper.
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utility (1) subject to the following (static) budget constraint
1Z
0
[PM;t(j)CP;M;t(j)] dj + PA;tC
O
P;A;t  WtNP;t (7)
where PA;tCOP;A;t denotes the nominal value of open market purchases of the agriculture
good done by the poor The poor agent derives utility from the amount of the agricultural
good consumed, while the expenditure depends only on a fraction, 1   t, of the quantity
consumed. It is easy to see that equation (7) can be re-written as
1Z
0
[PM;t(j)CP;M;t(j)] dj + PA;t(1  t)CP;A;t  WtNP;t: (8)
Hence the proportional quantity subsidy can be interpreted as a price subsidy. We dene:
P
0
A;t = (1   t)PA;t; which is the e¤ective price of the agriculture good paid by the poor
agent.
2.1.1 Optimal allocations
Optimal consumption allocations by the rich for A and M goods are given, respectively, by
CR;A;t = R

PA;t
Pt
 1
CR;t (9)
CR;M;t = (1  R)

PM;t
Pt
 1
CR;t (10)
where the aggregate price level is given by Pt = P
R
A;tP
1 R
M;t .
For poor households, consumption allocations for the A and M goods are given respec-
tively by
CP;A;t = P
 
P
0
A;t
P
0
t
! 1
CP;t (11)
CP;M;t = (1  P )

PM;t
P
0
t
 1
CP;t (12)
where the price index for the poor is given by: P
0
t = f(1  t)PA;tg
p P
1 p
M;t : Because of the
policy, t; it is important to note that the rich and poor face di¤erent price indices.
Using the fact that CR;M;t(j) =

PM;t(j)
PM;t
 "
CR;M;t and the demand functions in (9)-(10)
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implies that the budget constraint for the rich can be rewritten as
PtCR;t + EtfQt+1Bt+1g  Bt +WtNR;t   TR;t +Divt (13)
For the poor, using equations (11)-(12) implies
P
0
tCP;t  WtNP;t (14)
where CR;t and CP;t denote the consumption index (over the agriculture good and manufac-
turing good) of the rich and poor households, respectively. As seen in equation (14), the
impact of subsidizing the agriculture good for poor households reduces the e¤ective price to
P
0
t in their consumption basket.
The solutions to maximizing equation (1) subject to equation (13) for the rich and equa-
tion (14) for the poor yield the following optimality conditions:
1 = Et
"
CR;t+1
CR;t
 R Pt
Pt+1
Rt
#
(15)
Wt
Pt
=
N'R;t
C RR;t
for the rich (16)
Wt
P
0
t
=
N'P;t
C PP;t
for the poor (17)
where Rt = 1EtfQt+1g is the gross nominal return on the riskless one-period bond.
2.1.2 Terms of trade
Terms of trade (TOT) between the agriculture and the manufacturing sectors is dened as
Tt =
PA;t
PM;t
. CPI ination is then given by t = lnPt  lnPt 1, and the sectoral ination rates
are given by as A;t = lnPA;t   lnPA;t 1 and M;t = lnPM;t   lnPM;t 1, respectively, for the
agriculture and the manufacturing sectors. From the aggregate price index, CPI ination
can also be written in terms of TOT as
t = RA;t + (1  R)M;t = RTt + M;t: (18)
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2.1.3 Sectoral aggregates
We dene aggregate agriculture consumption as a weighted average of rich and poor agri-
culture consumption:
CA;t = RCR;A;t + (1  R)CP;A;t (19)
The total amount of redistributed grain and the consumption subsidy to the poor is given
by:
(1  R)C
S
P;A;t = tY
P
A;t (20)
where the government redistributes a fraction, t 2 [0; 1], of procured goods, Y PA;t; to the
poor. Substituting out for CP;A;t from (11) yields
CA;t|{z}
Total Ag. Con
= RR

PA;t
Pt
 1
CR;t| {z }
Con. by Rich
+ (1  R)P
 
P
0
A;t
P
0
t
! 1
CP;t| {z }
Con. by Poor
(21)
This implies
CA;t = RRT
 (1 R)
t CR;t + (1  R)p f(1  t)Ttg
 (1 p)CP;t (22)
Likewise, CM;t = RCR;M;t + (1  R)CP;M;t which implies
CM;t = R(1  R)T
R
t CR;t + (1  R)(1  P ) f(1  t)Ttg
p CP;t (23)
These two last equation imply that total agriculture and manufacturing consumption
depends on rich and poor consumption, and the terms of trade.
2.2 Firms
In the manufacturing sector, there is a continuum of rms indexed by j. Each rm produces
a di¤erentiated good with a linear technology given by the production function YM;t(j) =
AM;tNM;t(j). We assume that productivity shocks are the same across rms and follow an
AR(1) process,
logAM;t   logAM = M (logAM;t 1   logAM) + "M;t
where "M;t  i:i:d(0; M). The nominal marginal costs are common across rms and are
given byMCM;t = (1+M) WtAM;t where M is the employment subsidy given to manufacturing
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production. Real marginal costs is written as
mcM;t =
MCM;t
PM;t
= (1 + M)
Wt
Pt
T R
1
AM;t
: (24)
Let YM;t =

1R
0
YM;t (j)
" 1
" dj
 "
" 1
, where " > 1. Output demand is given by YM;t(j) =
PM;t(j)
PM;t
 "
YM;t. The labor supply allocation in manufacturing sector is obtained as
NM;t =
1Z
0
NM;t (j) dj =
YM;t
AM;t
ZM;t (25)
where ZM;t =
1R
0

PM;t(j)
PM;t
 "
dj represents the price dispersion term. Equilibrium variations
in ln
1R
0

PM;t(j)
PM;t
 "
dj around perfect foresight steady state are of second order. Given that
the agriculture sector is characterized by exible price and perfect competition, we can write
the sectoral aggregate production as
YA;t = AA;tNA;t (26)
where the productivity shock follows an AR(1) process,
logAA;t   logAA = A (logAA;t 1   logAA) + "A;t: (27)
where "A;t  i:i:d(0; A). Nominal marginal costs in the agriculture sector are given by
MCA;t =
Wt
AA;t
2.2.1 Price setting in the manufacturing sector
Price setting follows Calvo (1983), and is standard in the literature. Firms adjust prices
with probabilities (1   ) independent of the time elapsed since the previous adjustment.
The ination dynamics under such price setting is
M;t = EtfM;t+1g+ fmcM;t (28)
where  = (1 )(1 )

, and fmcM;t is the deviation of the real marginal cost in the manufac-
turing sector from its natural rate (to be dened later).
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2.3 Government procurement
In each period, the government procures Y PA;t amount of agricultural output at the market
price PA;t using the tax receipts from the rich and redistributes a fraction (t 2 [0; 1]) of
procured goods to the poor.12 The redistributed amount is given by tY PA;t. The agricultural
sector output is the sum of consumption and the amount accumulated by the bu¤er stock
YA;t = CA;t + (1  t)Y
P
A;t (29)
where the total consumption of the agricultural good CA;t consists of the total amount
consumed (by both the rich and poor): A procurement shock is given by an AR(1) process,
lnY PA;t   lnY
P
A = Y P
A
(lnY PA;t 1   lnY
P
A ) + "Y PA;t (30)
where 
Y P
A
2 (0; 1) and "Y P
A;t
 i:i:d(0; Y P
A
): Re-distributive policy shocks, captured by
changes in t; capture sudden increases in the fraction of procured grain re-distributed to
the poor, and are given by the following AR(1) process,
lnt   ln = (lnt 1   ln) + " (31)
where  2 (0; 1) and "  i:i:d(0; ):
3 Equilibrium Dynamics
3.1 Market Clearing
Market clearing is given by the following equations:
Ct = RCR;t + (1  R)CP;t (1  t)
 (1 p) T
p R
t (1  t(1  p)) (32)
Nt = NA;t +NM;t (33)
YM;t = CM;t (34)
Yt = Ct + T
1 R
t Y
P
A;t(1  t) (35)
12Please note that when P is super-script, it refers to procurement. When it is sub-script, it refers to the
poor.
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Yt = T
1 R
t YA;t + T
 R
t YM;t (36)
RTR;t =

(1  t)Y
P
A;t + C
S
P;A;t(1  R)

PA;t = PA;tY
P
A;t (37)
and equation (29). Equation (32) corresponds to aggregate consumption by both rich and
poor households obtained by adding nominal values of agriculture and manufacturing con-
sumption, weighted by their respective masses, R; and 1   R in the population (which is
normalized to 1), and deating by the price index. Both the policy, t; and the terms of
trade, Tt; are seen to a¤ect aggregate consumption positively.13 The labor market clearing
condition is given by equation (33). The agriculture market clearing condition is given by
equation (29). The manufacturing goods market clearing condition is given by equation
(34). The aggregate goods market clearing condition is given by equation (35) which can
be written in terms of Tt as in equation (36). Equation (37) is the government budget
constraint, which equates lump sum taxes collected from the rich to the nominal value of
redistribution (CSP;A;t(1  R)) and the fraction of procured output that goes towards bu¤er
stock accumulation ((1  t)Y PA;t):
3.2 Log-linearization
We relegate a discussion and derivation of the steady state and complete log-linearized model
to the Technical Appendix. What is of interest here are the log-linearized expressions forbCP;t and bCR;t; as these give the di¤erential impact on consumption of the poor and rich from
a variety of shocks. Log linearization of the aggregate market clearing condition (equation
(35)) gives
bYt = c bCt + (1  c) (1  R)bTt + bY PA;t    11  
 bt (38)
=

1  A
1  
 bCt + A   
1  

(1  R)bTt + bY PA;t    11  
 bt
where c is the steady state consumption share in output and is dened in equation (59). Log
linearization of aggregate consumption, Ct; in equation (32) gives
13Comparative statics suggest that higher redistribution (higher ; holding T constant) lowers the e¤ective
price index of the poor agent. This leads to a positive income e¤ect. Holding  constant and raising T leads
to higher consumption, as a higher terms of trade has a positive impact on output, from equation (36).
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bCt = sR bCR;t + (1  sR)((1  p) bCP;t + p  bt

+ bY PA;t
!
+ [p   R + p(1  p)] bTt)
(39)
where sR is the steady consumption share of the rich households, and  =
(1 p)
1 (1 p)
: Log
linearization of the rst order conditions (equations (16) and (17)) for the rich and poor
households give
cWt   bPt = ' bNR;t + R bCR;t (40)
and cWt   bPt = ' bNP;t + P bCP;t   p
1  
^t + (p   R)bTt: (41)
The log-linearized consumption of the poor, bCP;t; is given by
bCP;t = R
P + p
bCR;t + p
P + p
" bt

+ bY PA;t
#
 

p   R   p(1  p)
P + p
 bTt (42)
where p =
p
(1 p)
:14 Note that bCP;t is increasing in the redistribution shock, bt; the steady
state deviation of procurement, bY PA;t; and is a¤ected negatively by the steady state devi-
ation of the terms of trade,cT t. An increase in procurement and redistribution induces a
"redistribution-e¤ect" which raises consumption of the poor because it provides subsidized
goods which raises their consumption. A rise in the consumption of the rich increases con-
sumption of the poor because of our assumption that the labor supply of the rich and poor
are constant fractions of total labor supply. The terms of trade exerts a negative impact
(assuming the sign in front of bTt is positive) on consumption as a higher relative price of the
agriculture good makes the consumption basket of the poor more expensive. This induces
the poor to buy less agricultural output. If both the rich and poor households have the same
inter-temporal elasticity of substitution, i.e., R = P , p = R, and there is no redistributive
policy, i.e.,  = 0, then bCt = bCR;t = bCP;t.
Log linearization of the Euler equation (15) for the rich households around zero ination
in the steady state gives
bCR;t = Etf bCR;t+1g   1
R
h bRt   Etft+1gi (43)
14We assume that the share of rich, 0 < R < 1; in employment is equal to the share of rich in the
population, i.e., NR;t = RNt and NP;t = (1  R)Nt. This imples that bNR;t = bNP;t = bNt for all t.
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Substituting bCP;t in equation.(42).into (39), solving for bCR;t; and substituting the result-
ing expression for bCR;t in equation (43), gives us the Euler equation in terms of aggregate
consumption, bCt; as
bCt = Etf bCt+1g  1 h bRt   Etft+1gi 	Et(bt+1

+bY PA;t+1 + f(1  p) + (p   R) zgbTt+1
)
(44)
where
 =
R(P + p)
sR(P + p) + (1  sR)R(1  p)
; (45)
 = (1 p)
(1 (1 p))
; 	 =
p(1 sR)(1+P )
P+p
; and z = p+p (1 p)
p(1+p)
: With R = P ; sR = 1; and
 = 0, equation (44) becomes the standard Euler equation for homogenous households.
3.3 Gap Variables
Dene, bXNt as the deviation of lnXt under exible prices from the steady state , bXNt =
lnXNt   lnX. Also, dene a gap of a variable as eXt = bXt   bXNt : Then, the dynamic IS
equation (DIS) is given by
eYt = Et neYt+1o  c 1 h bRt   Etft+1g   bRNt i (46)
  [(1  R)(1  c) + 	c f(1  p) + (p   R)zg]Et
n
eTt+1o
where bRNt is the real natural interest rate and is given by
bRNt =   	(1   1) + '(1  c) 1Et nbYPA;t+1o (47)
 

	

(1   1)   1'(1  c)

1
1  

Et
n
bt+1o
+  1Et
h
' bAt+1 + bAM;t+1i
+ 

	(1 +  1) (1  p + (p   R)z) + 
 1 f(1  sR)'c(p + p   R)  Rg

Et
n
bTNt+1o
The NKPC (New Keynesian Phillips Curve) in terms of manufacturing sector ination, the
consumption gap, and the terms of trade gap is given by,
M;t = EtfM;t+1g+ eCt+ [R   (1  sR)'c(p + p   R) 	f1  p + (p   R)zg] eTt
(48)
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We can also express the NKPC in terms of aggregate ination and the output gap,
t = Etft+1g+

c
eYt (49)
+ 

R   (1  sR)'c(p + p   R) 	(1  p + (p   R)z)  (1  R)

A   
1  A
 eTt
+ ReTt   REtfeTt+1g:
Equations (46), the Dynamic IS curve, and (49), the New Keynesian Phillips curve,
summarize the non-policy block of the economy in our two sector two agent framework.
How do these equations di¤er compare to the simple NK model in Gali (2015, Chapter 3)
with a single agent and a single sticky price sector? There are three key di¤erences between
the current framework and such a benchmark. The rst di¤erence is that there are two
sectors which implies that the terms of trade, Tt; appears in the NKPC and the DIS. The
second di¤erence is that we have two types of agents (i.e., sR 6= 1) who have di¤erent IESs
(R 6= P ); and in general, di¤erent shares of agriculture in consumption (R 6= p). The
third di¤erence is that there is (steady state) procurement and redistribution in the current
framework, i.e., A   > 0; and  > 0: When A   > 0; this implies that the employment
share and consumption share in agriculture diverge i.e., c = C
Y
= 1 A
1 
< 1: Hence, A  > 0
drives a wedge between consumption and production in the aggregate economy.15
3.4 Monetary Policy Rule
Monetary policy follows a simple Taylor rule with the nominal interest rate as a function
of aggregate ination and the economy wide output gap. We use a simple generalization of
Taylor (1993):
Rt = (Rt 1)
r (t)


Yt
Y nt
y
: (50)
15Suppose sR = 1; A = R = p = 0 (which implies  = 0); R = P ; and  = 0: Then equation (46) is
given by eYt = Et neYt+1o  1
R
h bRt   Etft+1g   bRNt i
where bRNt = R(1+')'+R Et h4A^M;t+1i ; which is the DIS equation in the simple NK model as in Gali (2015,
Chapter 3). Further, the New Keynesian Phillips Curve in equation (49) is given by
t = Etft+1g+ ('+ R)eYt
which is the NKPC in the simple NK model where t = M;t and eYt = eYM;t:
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The log-linearized version of the Taylor rule shows that
R^t = rR^t 1 + t + y eYt; (51)
i.e., the nominal interest rate, R^t; depends on its lagged value, R^t 1; aggregate inations
deviation from its target, t; and the aggregate output gap, eYt: This closes the model.
4 Quantitative Analysis
4.1 Calibrated and Estimated Parameters
In this section, we calibrate the model to Indian data.16 Our primary goal is to understand
the quantitative implications of a positive procurement and redistributive shock (a demand
side shock) to the economy. We rst however discuss the case of a positive agricultural
productivity shock (a supply side shock). This is done to determine the di¤erential impacts
of a positive demand side and positive supply side shock on the economy. We use the
impulse response functions to assess implications for the aggregate dynamics of the economy,
highlighting the intuition behind how the shock impacts rich and poor consumption. A
detailed description of parameter estimates is in the Data Appendix.
4.1.1 Description of parameters
We use Levine et al. (2012) to set the discount factor for India at = 0:9823. Following
Anand and Prasad (2010), we choose the value of the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of
substitution, ' = 3 Using Atkeson and Ogaki (1996), we x the value of the inter-temporal
elasticity of substitution (IES) for the rich and poor to be 0:8 and 0:5, respectively. We
use the 2011-2012 Employment and Unemployment Survey of the National Sample Survey
(NSS) 68th round to set the share of workers in agriculture to 0:48 (this gure excludes
allied activities). The share of rich in population, R; is estimated to be 0:3279: The share
of agriculture in consumption of the rich, R; and poor, p; is determined by the share of
cereals and cereal substitutes in total expenditures net of expenditures on services, durables,
vegetables, fuels and is equal to 0:3527 and 0:4807; respectively.
We set the measure of price stickiness for the manufacturing sector,  = 0.75, as estimated
in Levine et al. (2012) for the formal sector in India. We set the value of the persistence
parameters and standard errors for the agricultural and manufacturing productivity equal
to those given in Anand and Prasad (2010). Thus, for productivity shocks in the agriculture
16We use Dynare Version 4.5.7 to calibrate the model.
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sector, the AR(1) coe¢cient is calibrated to be, A = 0:25 and for the manufacturing sector,
M = 0:95. The standard error of the regressions are given by A = 0:03 and M =0:02;
respectively. Following Levine et. al. (2012), the elasticity of substitution between varieties
of manufacturing goods is set to " = 7:02 for the Indian case
We estimate an AR (1) processes on procurement and redistribution as described in
equation (30) and (31) using the procurement and o¤-take data from Table 27: Public
Distribution System  Procurement, o¤-take and stocks.17 In our paper, we conne our
analysis to procurement of wheat and rice, two of the major grains procured under the
NFSA and distributed under the PDS (the Public Distribution System). Using data from
1980-2019, we rst make both the procurement and o¤-take series stationary by subtracting
the natural log of the average (value of the series) from the natural log of total procurement
and total o¤-take (wheat and rice) series and regress it on a constant, trend and AR(1)
term.18 This yields the persistence coe¢cient and the standard error of the regression. The
estimated persistence parameters for procurement (
Y P
A
) and redistribution () processes
are 0:43 and 0:59, respectively, while the standard errors are Y P
A
= 0:13 and  = 0:11.
We estimate the steady state share of the rich in consumption as sR = 0:5367. This is
calculated by computing the share of consumption by the rich in total consumption. This
is done by taking a weighted average of rich agents consumption expenditure shares in
rural and urban areas with their respective population share as weights. We calculate the
economy-wide parameter ; which is the subsidized proportion of grain, to be a weighted
average of the rural and urban  with their respective share in the total poor as weights. This
implies  = 0:2457. We calculate the steady state share of redistribution, ; from equation
(63).
Following Levine et al. (2012), we x the interest rate smoothening parameter to be
r = 0:66, with weights on ination to be  = 1:2, and the weight on the output gap,
y = 0:5. Table 1 below summarizes the structural parameters used in the calibration
exercise in our model and their values.
17See the RBIs Handbook of Statistics on the Indian Economy, 2018-2019.
18Since t 2 [0; 1]; ln (t) < 0. Hence, we use the logs of total (rice and wheat) o¤-take (instead of
fractions) to estimate  and :
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Structural and Steady State Parameters Notation Value Source
Discount factor  0.9823 Levine et al. (2012)
Inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply ' 3 Anand and Prasad (2012)
IES - Rich 1=R 0.8 Atkeson and Ogaki (1996)
IES - Poor 1=P 0.5 Atkeson and Ogaki (1996)
Population share of rich R 0.3279 Calculated by Authors
Steady state consumption share of rich sR 0.5367 Calculated by Authors
Steady state share of subsidy in CP;A;t  0.2457 Calculated by Authors
Steady state employment share in agriculture A 0.48 Calculated by Authors
Expenditure share of agriculture - Rich R 0.3527 Calculated by Authors
Out of pocket Expenditure share of agriculture - Poor P 0.4807 Calculated by Authors
Elas. of Subs. between varieties of M good " 7.02 Levine et al. (2012)
Measure of price stickiness (M)  0.75 Levine et al. (2012)
Shock Parameters
Productivity shock in A-sector AA 0.25 Anand and Prasad (2012)
Productivity shock in M-sector A
M
0.95 Anand and Prasad (2012)
Procurement shock YPG 0.43 Estimated by Authors
Redistribution shock  0.59 Estimated by Authors
Standard Errors
Productivity shock in A sector A 0.03 Anand and Prasad (2012)
Productivity shock in M sector M 0.02 Anand and Prasad (2012)
Procurement shock 
YPG
0.13 Estimated by Authors
Redistribution shock  0.11 Estimated by Authors
Monetary Policy Parameters
Interest rate smoothing r 0:66 Levine et al. (2012)
Weight on ination gap  1.2 Levine et al. (2012)
Weight on output gap y 0.5 Levine et al. (2012)
Table 1: Summary of Parameter Values
4.2 Impulse response analysis
In this section, we study the impulse response functions (IRFs) of the relevant macroeconomic
variables with respect to shocks to agriculture productivity (a supply shock) and procurement
and redistribution (a demand side shock). Both shocks are bench-marked against a one agent
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two sector NK DSGE model along the lines of Aokis model19 This allows us to highlight the
importance of having rich and poor agents and redistributive policy shocks in the model. We
also discuss the case of a monetary policy shock. Throughout the IRF analysis, our focus is
on understanding how these shocks a¤ect sectoral and aggregate ination rates, consumption
of rich and poor agents, and therefore welfare.
Depending on the nature of the shock, we benchmark these IRFs against a simple NK
model a la Gali (2015, Chapter 3), Aoki, and Debortoli and Gali. We allow for the procure-
ment wedge to be positive, i.e. A    > 0, and  > 0; in our model.20 Also, given the
calibrated parameters, p > R: This implies that the share of agriculture consumption by
the poor (out of total poor consumption) exceeds the share of agriculture consumption by
the rich (out of total rich consumption) which inuences the impact e¤ect of the shock on
poor and rich agricultural consumption.
4.2.1 Transmission of a single period positive productivity shock in the A-sector
We rst describe what happens in our (2 sector TANK) model. This corresponds to the red-
dashed line in Figures 1a-1c. A positive agricultural productivity shock raises the supply of
agricultural output on impact, which in turn leads to a reduction in price of the agricultural
good, PA: This leads to a fall in agriculture ination, A; overall ination, ; and a decline
(worsening) in the terms of trade, T . Nominal wages, W; rise on impact since the value of
the marginal product in agriculture (= PAAA) rises (despite PA falling). Real wages (WP )
also rise as the nominal wage rises and the price level of the economy falls. The substitution
e¤ect of higher real wages increases the cost of leisure relative to consumption and causes C
to rise and leisure to fall (N to rise). Given the parameters in the model, the income e¤ect
(which causes N to fall) dominates the substitution e¤ect, and so aggregate employment, N;
falls (Figure 1b).21 The income e¤ect from a higher real wage also implies that the demand
for the agricultural good (CA) and manufacturing good (CM) both rise. The rise in CM
induces a shift of employment out of the agriculture sector (NA falls) into the manufacturing
sector (NM rises·) on impact, although aggregate employment falls.
Aggregate output increases because both agriculture output (YA) and manufacturing
output (YM) increase despite a fall in the terms of trade. Ination in the manufacturing
19To generate the Aoki model as a special case of our model, the following parameter restrictions are
imposed: R = sR = 1; p = R;  = 0; A = R; R = P ; and an arbitrarily small value of  =
1:000  10 25: For single agent models in the IRFs (Aokis model and the simple NK model), we have
exogenously imposed that CP = 0 as there is no poor agent in these models.
20We drop subscripts (t) and hats from variables for the following discussion to economize on notation.
The IRFs for variables however should be interpreted as their log deviations.
21This is because of our estimated parameters. If we choose R = 0:5 and P = 0:8; aggregate employment
in the economy increases.
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sector falls because the sum of current and expected future marginal costs fall. This can
be seen from equation (78). The output gap becomes positive because it depends on the
consumption gap and the terms of trade gap. Since ination in both the agriculture sector
(A) and the manufacturing sector (M ) falls, aggregate ination () falls. The decline in
ination induces the central bank from the Taylor rule, equation (51), to cut nominal interest
rates. Real rates also fall since prices are sticky, which induces a rise in the consumption of
rich households, CR;because of the inter-temporal substitution e¤ect: From equation (42),
it is apparent that the impact of poor household consumption, CP ; depends positively on
CR and the terms of trade. Overall, CP rises leading to aggregate consumption, C; to rise.
Hence, welfare rises. In sum, a positive agriculture productivity shock leads to a rise in both
poor and rich consumption, and therefore higher welfare.
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Figure 1a: Impact of single period positive agriculture productivity shock
22
2 4 6 8 10 12
-10
-5
0
10-3 Agricultural Employment
2S-RANK (Aoki)
2S-TANK (Our Model)
2 4 6 8 10 12
0
5
10
10-3 Aggregate Output
2 4 6 8 10 12
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
10-3 Output Gap
2 4 6 8 10 12
-1
-0.5
0 10
-3 Manufacturing Inflation
2 4 6 8 10 12
-10
-5
0
5 10
-3 Aggregate Inflation
2 4 6 8 10 12
-10
-5
0
10-3 Nominal Interest Rate
2 4 6 8 10 12
-15
-10
-5
0
10-3 Real Interest Rate
2 4 6 8 10 12
0
5
10
15
10-3 Rich Consumption
2 4 6 8 10 12
0
5
10 10
-3 Poor Consumption
Figure 1b: Impact of single period positive agriculture productivity shock
Distributional Impact Both the rich and poor benet from higher wages because of a
positive productivity shock. This induces both sets of households to increase their consump-
tion of both the manufacturing and agriculture good. However, the decline in the terms of
trade (PA falls relative to PM) induces both the rich and poor to increase their demand of
the agriculture good comparatively more because of the inter-good substitution e¤ect. As
can be seen below, the impact e¤ect of a positive productivity shock is to induce rich and
poor households to buy the agriculture good comparatively more than the manufacturing
good. Agriculture consumption therefore rises strongly on impact. The relative magnitudes
of rich-poor consumption however, implies that poor consumption increases less relative to
rich consumption suggesting that the rich gain more compared to the poor.
As can be seen in Figures 1a-1c, the model dynamics in our model and the Aoki (green-
dashed line) model are qualitatively similar. In our model, the impact e¤ect on aggregate
employment is lower because of the presence of agents that have a lower inter-temporal
elasticity of substitution in consumption. They would like to enjoy a greater level of leisure
relative to consumption. This leads to lower consumption by the poor in our model relative
to Aoki (Figure 1b), and a greater decline in aggregate employment on impact. Compared
to Aoki, the steady state values of sectoral and aggregate consumption are lower.22 This
causes the e¤ect of a positive agriculture shock to have a greater e¤ect on (dis)ination, and
a greater e¤ect on impact on the terms of trade. Due to a higher share of consumption of the
22In the Aoki model, the income e¤ect causes consumption of both goods to rise. As the share of manu-
facturing in the (representative) agents basket is larger (1  R = 0:648); aggregate employment rises.
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agriculture good in the consumption basket of the poor, the inter-good substitution e¤ect
is strong for the poor, and the poor agents manufacturing consumption increases by less as
compared to the rich agents consumption in the Aoki model. In both models however, a
productivity shock raises aggregate consumption and welfare.
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Figure 1c: Impact of single period positive agriculture productivity shock
4.2.2 Transmission of a single period procurement and redistribution shock
We rst describe what happens in our (2 sector TANK) model. This corresponds to the red-
dashed line in Figures 2a-2c. A procurement and re-distribution (which are orthogonalized)
shock acts like a demand shock to the economy.23 On impact, a procurement and redistribu-
tion shock leads to higher demand for agricultural output,YA; higher PA and therefore higher
A. This leads to an increase in the terms of trade, T . For the supply of the agriculture
good to increase with no change in productivity, employment in the agriculture sector, NA;
must go up on impact. In order to attract labor to the agriculture sector, nominal wages in
the agriculture sector must rise. With sticky prices in the manufacturing sector, equilibrium
in labor markets (the same nominal wage in both sectors) means that economy wide real
wages rise.24
23The reason why we consider them simultaneously is because the governments desire to increase pro-
curement is driven by its desire for higher re-distribution.
24This is broadline in line with research on the Indian National Food Security Act in 2013 which shows
that changes in the generosity of the Public Distribution System led to higher wages, suggesting that labor
market e¤ects of social transfers bestow important additional e¤ects in terms of benets for the poor. See
Shrinivas, Baylis, and Crost (2019).
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As before, a rise in the real wages has two competing e¤ects income and substitution
e¤ects. The income e¤ect states that a rise in the real wages (income) of an agent would
lead to greater consumption of both consumption and leisure (C rises, N falls) while the
substitution e¤ect states that a rise in real wages makes leisure relatively more expensive and
hence leisure should fall and consumption should rise (C rises, N rises). The rich agents
consumption is governed by a third e¤ect  the inter-temporal consumption substitution
e¤ect which states that an increase in the real interest rate will induce agents to save today
and consume tomorrow, i.e., substitute todays consumption for future consumption.
As the poor agents dont have access to capital markets  they cannot smooth their
consumption over time. However, in the presence of a procurement and redistribution shock,
their consumption is governed by another e¤ect, a re-distributive e¤ect. The redistributive
aspect of the policy lowers the e¤ective price of the poor agents basket. More precisely it
lowers the price of the agricultural good paid by the poor agents to PA(1   ) which turns
out to be lower than PM . This leads to an increase in CP , CP;A and a decrease in CP;M .25
Under the current parametrization, consumption of the rich is determined by the inter-
temporal substitution e¤ect while the poor agents consumption is determined by income and
redistributive e¤ects. As A is positive and current and future marginal costs of production
are positive, manufacturing and aggregate ination are positive on impact. A positive output
gap obtains because under exible prices, manufacturing prices increase in response to higher
real wages. This causes a greater reduction in manufacturing output relative to the sticky
price level of output causing a positive output gap. Given this, central banks must raise
nominal interest rates. With sticky prices, real interest rates also rise on impact. Given our
parameters, we nd that C rises leading to higher welfare, even though monetary policy has
tightened the interest rate.
25When we only do a procurement shock and set  = 0; both CP and CR fall. Thus, the redistributive
e¤ect determines the poor agents consumption.
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Figure 2b: Impact of single period positive procurement and redistribution shock
Distributional Impact As can be seen in Figure 2c, rich agriculture and rich manu-
facturing consumption fall because of inter-temporal substitution. However, a rise in poor
agriculture consumption on impact leads to a rise in overall agriculture consumption. Poor
manufacturing consumption however also falls because PA(1   ) is lower than PM : Unlike
the previous case, CP rises relative to CR despite the central bank tightening interest rates.
26
2 4 6 8 10 12
-0.03
-0.02
-0.01
0
Rich Agricultural Consumption
2S-RANK (Aoki)
2S-TANK (Our Model)
2 4 6 8 10 12
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
Poor Agricultural Consumption
2 4 6 8 10 12
-0.04
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
Agricultural Consumption
2 4 6 8 10 12
-15
-10
-5
0
10 -3 Rich Manufacturing Consumption
2 4 6 8 10 12
-0.03
-0.02
-0.01
0
Poor Manufacturing Consumption
2 4 6 8 10 12
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
Poor-Rich Consumption Ratio
Figure 2c: Impact of single period positive procurement and redistribution shock
Compared to Aokis model (green dashed line), there are interesting di¤erences.26 In the
Aoki model, all agents are rich (Ricardian) and do not have access to subsidized consump-
tion of the agriculture good. Employment in our model, like before, is lower compared to
Aoki because of the presence of poor agents who have a lower inter-temporal elasticity of
substitution. The di¤erence in the expenditure share of the agriculture good by the poor, p;
plays an important role on the rich-poor consumption dynamics. Since the poor receive the
redistributed agricultural good for free, their demand for market purchases of the agriculture
good are lower (Figure 2a). In addition, p > R; and so the redistributed agricultural good
induces a lower demand for agricultural good consumption by the poor from the market.
As a result, aggregate demand for agricultural output is lower, and the impact e¤ect of a
procurement and redistributive shock on agricultural output in our model is less compared
to the Aoki model Correspondingly, a procurement and redistributive shock leads to lower
ination on impact in our model compared to Aokis model. As a result, the corresponding
rise in the real interest rate from the Taylor rule is lower in our model which implies that the
decline in rich consumption is lower in our model compared to Aoki. Importantly, because
of the redistributive shock, poor consumption rises in our model, o¤-setting the decline in
rich consumption, and raising aggregate welfare.
26We have imposed A > R to generate these IRFs. Since Aokis model has a single agent, there is
no redistribution, and therefore no redistributive policy shock in his model. The only shock therefore is a
procurement shock, which generates the impulses given by the green dashed line.
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4.2.3 Transmission of a single period monetary policy shock
We consider a single period, contractionary monetary policy shock, which increases the
nominal interest rate. This exercise is included to emphasize how our two sector TANK
model (red-dashed line) leads to a muted impact (less monetary transmission) compared to
a variety of benchmarks (the simple NK model (magenta line), Aoki (green-dashed line),
and Debortoli and Gali (blue dashed line)).27 Crucially, we show that monetary policy has
both output e¤ects and redistributive e¤ects, as in the HANK literature. Our basic insight
is that the model dynamics are more inuenced by having two sectors, i.e., adding a exible
price sector, rather than the demand side, i.e., having poor agents, when there is a monetary
policy shock.
As in the previous cases, we rst discuss the e¤ect of a monetary policy shock on our 2
sector TANK model (red-dashed line) in Figures 3a-3c. In response to a rise in the nominal
interest rate the real interest rate rises, leading to inter-temporal consumption substitution
by the rich. The reduction in aggregate demand causes a reduction in prices in both sectors,
with the magnitude being greater in the agricultural sector due to exible prices. As the
interest rate shock is for a single period, the agricultural ination returns to its steady state
value in the next period, while the manufacturing sector ination recovers gradually. Thus
aggregate ination falls by more on impact but recovers quickly (owing to the exible price
sector) as compared to the one sector models in this analysis. As a result, the real interest
rates rises less in our two sector TANK economy This leads to a reduction in the terms of
trade, T; and thus a smaller reduction in CP relative to CR:
In the current scenario, where there is no government intervention in the agriculture
market, aggregate output is the same as aggregate consumption, and so on impact, Y; must
fall from its steady state value. For the supply of the output to decline, less goods must be
produced and hence employment, N; should fall on impact. This is ensured by lower real
wages, which fall on impact.
In the two sector TANK economy, as the terms of trade falls in response to a contrac-
tionary monetary policy shock, the agricultural good is relatively cheaper and hence demand
for the agricultural (exible price) good increases while for the manufacturing (sticky price)
good falls (inter-good substitution e¤ect). Consequently NA rises on impact, and therefore,
27To generate IRFs for 2 agents and 1 sector along the lines of Debortoli and Gali, we have imposed
R = p =  = A = 0; = 1:0000  10
 25; steady state values of YA = CA = C = Y = YM = 1: Note that
the steady state value of YM = 1 since under the above values,  = 0: We have retained the values of sR;
R; R; and P as in our 2 sector TANK framework listed in Table 1. For the simple NK model, we impose
the additional restrictions: sR = R = 1; and R = P = 1:25; to generate the IRFs for this benchmark. As
a preliminary check, we verify that the model dynamics for the simple NK model generated here has IRFs
for a contractionary monetary policy shock that are consistent with Gali (2015, Chapter 3, page 69).
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NM falls.
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Figure 3b: Impact of single period contractionary monetary policy shock
Distributional Impact A contractionary monetary policy shock leads to a reduction in
aggregate consumption in all models, although the magnitude of reduction is smaller in the
two sector models (ours and Aokis model). This happens because of the smaller increase in
the real interest rate due to the presence of a exible price sector.28 However, as the output
28We would expect transmission to be weaker in TANK models as a fraction of agents cannot smooth their
consumption, but the e¤ect of the negative terms of trade lowers their consumption.
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gap adjusts more sluggishly, the real interest rate and aggregate consumption take longer to
reach their steady state values in the two sector TANK model. Further, in the two agent
models (our model and Debortoli and Gali), CR < C < CP < 0. In the single agent models
(Aokis model and the simple NK model), CR = CP = C < 0.
As mentioned above, the presence of a exible price sector in our model and Aokis model
creates a large deation in the economy because of the contractionary monetary policy shock.
Since the shock is of one period, aggregate ination returns to the steady state in the next
period in both our model and the Aoki model. Manufacturing ination, however, recovers,
gradually, because of the sticky price sector in all the models. The rise in the nominal interest
rate leads to the inter-temporal substitution of consumption, as in the standard NK model,
which causes a reduction in aggregate demand and a decline in the aggregate price level
in all models. However, in our model and Aokis model, due to the presence of a exible
price sector, real interest rates increase by less, and therefore rich consumption falls by less
compared to Debortoli and Gali and the simple NK model. As a result, poor consumption
also falls by less from equation (42). The decline in aggregate consumption is also less in
our model and Aokis model. This implies the welfare losses from contractionary monetary
policy shocks are less in magnitude because of the muted increase in real interest rates, which
in turn, is driven by the presence of a exible price sector.
Since the contractionary monetary policy shock reduces the terms of trade, the agri-
culture good is relatively cheaper compared to the manufacturing good and hence demand
for the agriculture good (exible price) increases while for the manufacturing good (sticky
price) falls. This leads to a rise in agricultural employment, and a decline in manufacturing
employment on impact in both our model and Aokis model.
Our analysis therefore highlights that monetary policy shocks have both output e¤ects
and redistributive e¤ects.
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Figure 3c: Impact of single period contractionary monetary policy shock
5 Conclusion
Governments in many EMDEs routinely intervene in their agricultural markets because of
changing food security norms or to minimize food price volatility. Such interventions typi-
cally involve higher procurement and redistribution of food commodities by the government
to households. This paper asks: what is the impact of a procurement and redistributive policy
shock on the sectoral and aggregate dynamics of ination, and the distribution of consump-
tion amongst rich and poor households? To address this, we build a tractable two-sector
(agriculture and manufacturing) two-agent (rich and poor) New Keynesian DSGE model
with redistributive policy shocks. We calibrate the model to the Indian economy. There are
two novel aspects of our framework. First, we extend the framework of Debortoli and Gali
to two sectors in a tractable way. Second, we allow for government intervention in the agri-
culture market in a way that captures the essence of procurement and redistribution style
interventions in EMDEs. Our framework allows us to understand how redistributive policy
shocks a¤ect the economy, and the role of consumer heterogeneity on the welfare implications
of a variety of shocks. Our paper contributes to a growing literature on understanding the
role of consumer heterogeneity in analyzing the e¤ect of monetary policy.
We show that a procurement and redistribution shock leads to higher sectoral and aggre-
gate ination and higher aggregate consumption in the economy, even though such shocks
raise real interest rates, and there is a decline in the consumption of the rich. Our main result
is that for an ination targeting central bank, consumer heterogeneity matters for whether
monetary policy responses to shocks raise aggregate welfare or not. Hence, it is important
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to take into account consumer heterogeneity when evaluating the general equilibrium e¤ects
of monetary policy in the economy. We compare our results to a variety of benchmarks to
isolate the e¤ect of adding a exible price production sector or adding rule of thumb agents
on the models dynamics.
For future work, we plan to characterize optimal monetary policy in our framework.
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6 Technical Appendix
6.1 The Model
Derivation of Equation (15): In the rst stage, rich agents maximize equation (4) for a
given level of expenditure, Xt subject to the period budget constraint given by: PA;tCR;A;t+
PM;tCR;M;t = Xt; This yields equations (9) and (10) In the second stage, rich household
maximize (1) subject to the inter-temporal budget constraint (5) choosing CR:t; NR;t; and
Bt+1 optimally. This yields the following rst order conditions:
C RR;t = tPt
N'R;t = tWt
and
 EtfQt+1g
tt + 
t+1Etft+1g = 0
where t is the Lagrangian multiplier. Using 1EtfQt+1g = Rt; this yields equation (15).
Derivation of Equation (17): Poor agents maximize (4) subject to: PA;tCOP;A;t +
PM;tCP;M;t = Mt; where Mt corresponds to the income of the poor, by choosing CP;A;t and
CP;M;t optimally. Note that COP;A;t = (1  t)CP;A;t given equation (6). This yields equation
(11) and (12). Substituting equations (11) and (12) into equation (7) implies
PA;t(1  t)CP;A;t + PM;tCP;M;t  WtNP;t
which can be simplied to
P
0
tCP;t = WtNP;t:
In the second stage, poor households maximize (1) subject to the above equation
6.2 Steady State
We drop subscripts from variables to denote their steady state counterparts. Dene X
(without t subscript) as the steady state value of the variable, Xt: We assume no trend
growth in productivity, As = 1 for s = A;M: Since AM = AA = 1, nominal marginal costs
are given by: MCM = MCA = W . Given that the agricultural sector is characterized by
perfect competition and exible prices, price equals nominal marginal cost, so PA = W , while
in the manufacturing sector the price is a markup over nominal marginal cost PM = "" 1W .
Therefore, the steady state term of trade is T = PA
PM
= " 1
"
. With the employment subsidy
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in the manufacturing sector in place,
T = 1:
Dene the steady state consumption share of the rich, sR; as
sR =
RCR
C
(52)
and that of the poor as
1  sR =
(1  R)CP (1  )
 (1 p)(1  (1  p))
C
: (53)
Then using equation (32),
C = RCR + (1  R)(1  )
 (1 P )CP (1  (1  p))
1 =
RCR
C
+
1  R)(1  )
 (1 P )CP (1  (1  p))
C
:
We dene the steady state employment share of the rich, NR
NR = RN (54)
and the employment share of the poor as NP
NP = (1  R)N: (55)
From the FOCs for the rich and poor (equations (16) and (17)) the steady state condition is
N'R
C RR
=
N'P
C PP
:
P
0
P
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where P
0
P
= (1 )PT P R = (1 )P (since T = 1). SinceNR = RN andNP = (1 R)N ,
we have
'RC
R
R = (1  R)
'CPP (1  )
P
'R

sR
R
C
R
= (1  R)
'

(1  sR)
(1  R)(1  ) (1 P )(1  (1  P ))
C
P
(1  )P
CR P =
(1  R)
' RR
' P (1  sR)
sRR
P (1  )P+P (1 P )
(1  (1  p))
P
=  
The steady state aggregate consumption is therefore,
C =  
1
R P (56)
where   is a constant. Once we know the expression for C; equations (52) and (53) yield
CR and CP ; respectively. From the market clearing condition (equation ((34)), the pro-
duction function for manufacturing, and the optimal demand allocation (equation (23)) for
manufacturing goods, we have
NM = YM = CM = (1  )C = (1  ) 
1
R P :
where  = sRR +
(1 sR)P
1 (1 P )
:
Denoting A as the steady state employment share in agricultural sector, then, using
NM = (1  A)N; we can write aggregate employment, N , as
N =
NM
1  A
=
1  
1  A
C: (57)
And using NA = AN and the market clearing condition for the agriculture sector (equation
(29)),
N =
NA
A
=
YA
A
=
1
A

C + Y PA (1  )

: (58)
Equating (57) and (58), we obtain
Y PA =
C
1  

A   
1  A
:

This is the steady state level of agricultural output procured. For Y PA > 0, it needs to be
that A > , which implies that the steady state labor share in agriculture is greater than
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its consumption share since a fraction of agricultural output is not consumed. Note that
in the absence of procurement (Y PA = 0), and these two steady state shares are equal as
C

A 
1 A

= 0 =) A = . The steady state relation in the agricultural sector then becomes
NA = YA = CA + (1  )Y
P
A = C
A
1  A
(1  )
From the aggregate market clearing condition (equation (35)), Y = C + (1   )Y PA =
C

1 
1 A

. The steady state share of consumption in output
 
c = C
Y

equals
c =
1  A
1  
(59)
Note that as a fraction of the agriculture good is not consumed (A > ), c < 1.
We now relate c with the steady state share of consumption in output in the agricultural
sector

cA =
CA
YA

: We already have YA = C

A
1 A

(1  ), and CA = C: Therefore,
cA =
(1  A)
A(1  )
: (60)
Note that cA < c given that A > .
We next derive the steady state value of : Note that  = Y
P
A
(1 R)CPA
. From (11),
CPA = PCP (1  )
 (1 P ) (as T = 1) and using the relation between CP and C from.(53).
Therefore,
 =
Y PA (1  )
(1 P )
(1  R)PCP
=
Y PA (1  (1  P ))
P (1  sR)C
:
Using Y PA =
1
(1 )
(A )
(1 A)
C; this implies
 =
(A   )(1  (1  P ))
P (1  A)(1  )(1  sR)
(61)
Solving for , we obtain
 =
(A   )
(1  P )(A   ) + P (1  A)(1  sR)(1  )
: (62)
Solving for ;this implies
 =
P (1  A)(1  sR)
P (1  A)(1  sR) + (A   )(1  (1  P ))
: (63)
Given the other parameter restrictions in the model (A   > 0; A < 1; sR < 1; P > 0;  
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0;), this implies that   0 Since  < 1; this is equivalent to
 <
1
1  P
6.3 The Log-Linearized Model
Given the steady state, we log-linearize the key relationships of the model. Dene X^t =
lnXt   lnX as the log of deviation of X; where X is the steady state value of X: For
variables that are in fractions or have a percentage interpretation, we dene X^t = Xt  X:
Derivation of Equation (42): To derive an expression for the log-linearized consump-
tion for the poor, using the denition of t =
tY
P
A;t
CP;A;t(1 R)
, and using equation (11), we
have
t =
tY
P
A;t
(1  R)PCP (1  t) (1 p)T
 (1 P )
t
:
Log linearization of this equation gives
^t =

(1  )
1  P
" bt

+ bY PA;t   bCP;t + (1  P )bTt
#
The log-linearized rst order condition (equation (17)) for the poor is given by
cWt   bPt = ' bNP;t + (P + p) bCP;t   p " bt

+ bY PA;t
#
+ fP   R   P (1  P )g bTt
We assume that rich and poor labor supply is proportional to total labor supply, i.e., NR;t =
RNt and NP;t = (1   R)Nt, we have bNR;t = bNP;t = bNt. for all t. Combining this with
equations ((40) we get equation (42).
Derivation of Equation (64): To derive an expression for bCR;t;substituting equation
(42) for bCP;t into equation (39), the log-linearized consumption of the rich is given by,
bCR;t = sR + (1  sR)R(1  p)
P + p
 1
(64)" bCt  	" bt

+ bY PA;t
#
 

	(1  P ) + (1  sR)(P   R)

P + P   (1  P )
P + P
 bTt#
where 	 = p(1 sR)(1+P )
P+p
and  = (1 P )
1 (1 P )
Let x = 1  (1  p). Combining equations (44) and (38), we obtain the Euler equation
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in terms of aggregate output
bYt = EtfbYt+1g   c 1 h bRt   Etft+1gi (65)
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
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A   
1  A

+	 f(1  p) + (p   R)zg

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n
bTt+1o
  c

A   
1  A

+	

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n
bY PA;t+1o  c 	  

1
1  

A   
1  A

Et
n
bt+1o
Log-linearization of the market clearing condition in the agricultural sector (equation (29))
gives
bYA;t = c
A

sRR bCR;t + (1  sR) p
xs
bCP;t +(1  sR)p(1  p)
x
+

A   
1  A
 bY PA;t (66)
+
c
A

(1  sR)p(1  p)
x
 

1
1  

A   
1  A
 bt
 
c
A

sRR(1  R) +
(1  sR)p(1  p)
xs
 bTt
where s = 1  : Log-linearization of the optimal demand for manufacturing output (equation
(23)) gives
bYM;t = 1
1  

sR(1  R) bCR;t + (1  sR)(1  P )(1  )(1 + p)
x
 bCP;t (67)
+
1
1  

sR(1  R)R +
(1  sR)(1  P )(1  )(p   p(1  p))
x
 bTt
 
1
1  

p(1  sR)(1  )(1  p)
x

(
bt

+ bY PA;t)
Log-linearization of the labor market clearing condition (33) gives
bNt = A bNA;t + (1  A) bNM;t = AbYA;t + (1  A)bYM;t   bAt (68)
where bAt = A bAA;t + (1   A) bAM;t, and A = NAN is the steady state employment share in
agriculture. The last line uses log linearization of the sectoral production functions.
From equations (40) and (64) and noting that bNR;t = bNt, we can write equation (16) as
cWt   bPt = ' bNt +  bCt  	" bt

+ bY PA;t + f(1  p) + (p   R)zg bTt
#
(69)
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Substituting equations (66) and (67) into (68), and the resulting equation into (69), we get
cWt   bPt =  bCt + f'(1  c) 	g bY PA;t  '(1  c) 11  

+
	

 bt (70)
  ['c(1  sR) fp + P   Rg+	 f1  P + (P   R)zg] bTt   ' bAt
where  = f'c+ g.
Finally, the log linearized real marginal cost in the manufacturing sector is given by
cmcM;t = cWt   bPt + R bTt   bAM;t (71)
6.4 Flexible price equilibrium and the natural rate
Derivation of DIS in Equation (46): Given that under exible prices, real marginal
cost is a constant, so that cmcNM;t = 0, equation (71) becomes 0 = cWNt   bPNt + R bTNt   bAM;t.
Combining this with the exible price counterpart of equation (70), we get
bCNt =  1'(1  c) 11  

+
	

 bt (72)
   1 f'(1  c) 	g bY PA;t +  1 ' bAt + bAM;t
+  1

(1  sR)'cP  +	(1  p) + (p   R)

(1  sR)'c+
	(P + P   (1  P ))
P (1 + P )

  R
 bTNt
Note that procurement is the same under both sticky and exible prices. Substituting
out for c and 1  c in the above expression, the exible price counterpart of equation (38) is
bY Nt = c bCNt + (1  c) (1  R)bTNt + bY PA;t    11  
 bt (73)
=

1  A
1  
 bCNt + A   1  

(1  R)bTNt + bY PA;t    1  
 bt
Substituting equation (72) into equation (73), forwarding one period and then subtracting
from each other, we obtain
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bY Nt = Et nbY Nt+1o  (1  R)f1  c+ c	gEt nbTNt+1o (74)
  [c 1f(1  sR)'c ((p   R) + p)  R + 	 f1  p + (p   R)zg+ (1  c)(1  R)]Et
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 
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Finally, substituting (44) into (38) and then subtracting equation (74) we obtain the dynamic
IS (DIS) curve given by equation (46).
Derivation of NKPC in Equation (49): From equation (38), the consumption gap
is written as eCt = 1
c
heYt   (1  c)(1  R)eTti (75)
From equation (71) and given that cmcNM;t = 0,
fmcM;t = fWt   ePt + R eTt: (76)
And from equation (70),
fWt   ePt =  eCt   ['c(1  sR) fp + (p   R)g+	 f1  p + (p   R)zg] eTt (77)
Substituting equation (77) in equation (76) yields the manufacturing sector real marginal
cost gap in terms of the aggregate consumption gap and the terms of trade gap.
fmcM;t =  eCt + [R   'c(1  sR) fp + (p   R)g  	 f1  p + (p   R)zg] eTt (78)
We also have the relationship that connects CPI ination with sectoral ination and TOT
as
t = M;t + ReTt (79)
Substituting equations (75) and (79) into equation (28) yields equation (49).
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7 Data Appendix
In this section, we describe how we have estimated the structural parameters used in the
calibration exercise.
 Share of rich in population: R = 0:3279
 We dene agents to be poor if they receive food grain under the NFSA 2013.
Thus, we assume 25% of the rural population and 50% of the urban population to
be rich. Taking population of the rural and urban population to be 833.1 million
and 377.1 million from the Census of India 2011, we get R = 0:3279
 Share of agriculture in consumption for agents is determined by taking the ratio of
expenditure on cereals and cereal substitutes in total expenditure where the latter is
dened to be expenditure on cereals, cereals substitutes, pan tobacco and intoxicants,
clothing, footwear, toilet articles, other household consumables, and minor durable type
goods. We use data from Table 6B-R: Value of consumption (Rs) of broad groups of
food and non-food per person for a period of 30 days for each fractile class of MPCEMRP
(Page 104) and Table 6B-U: Value of consumption (Rs) of broad groups of food and
non-food per person for a period of 30 days for each fractile class of MPCEMRP (Page
105) from NSS Report 555- Level and Pattern of Consumer Expenditure 2011-12.
 Share of agriculture purchases by poor : P = 0:4807.
 We split the 7th decile (70-80%) into two halves for the rural data set (to be
able to get division into bottom 75% and top 25% by MPCE). The agriculture
expenditure shares for di¤erent fractile classes of rural areas are combined by
taking a weighted average using appropriate weights (0.1333 for deciles and
0.0667 for the rst two fractile classes (0-5% and 5-10%) and the (70-75%)
fractile class). The agriculture expenditure shares for di¤erent fractile classes
of urban areas are combined by taking a weighted average using appropriate
weights (0.2 for deciles and 0.1 for rst 2 fractile classes (0-5% and 5-10%)).
These two shares are combined by taking a weighted average using rural and
urban shares in total poor population as weights.
 Share of agriculture purchases by rich: R = 0:3527.
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 The agriculture expenditure shares for di¤erent fractiles of rural areas are
combined by taking a weighted average using appropriate weights (0.4 for the
70-80th percentile and 0.2 for the 70-75th, 90-95th and 95-100th percentiles)).
The agriculture expenditure shares for di¤erent fractiles of urban areas are
combined by taking a weighted average using appropriate weights (0.2 for
deciles and 0.1 for the 90-95th and 95-100th percentiles). These two shares
are combined by taking a weighted average using shares in the total rich
population as weights.
 Share of rich consumption relative to total consumption: sR = 0:5367
 We use data from Table 1C of NSS-Report 555: Estimated number of households
and persons by sex, and average MPCE for each fractile class of MPCEMMRP
(Page 83). Share of Total Consumption Expenditure for each fractile is computed
by multiplying the estimated number of people in each fractile class with Average
MPCE of that fractile class. The share of rich agents for the respective areas
is determined by dividing total consumption estimates for fractiles greater than
75% for the rural areas and above 50% for urban areas by their respective total
consumption estimates. The two shares are combined using the population shares
 Share of subsidized consumption:  = 0:2457
 We use data from Statement 2 of NSS-Report 565-Public Distribution System and
Other Sources of Household Consumption 2011-12 (Page 18). It states Percentage
of consumption (quantity) coming from PDS for households in di¤erent fractile
classes of MPCE separately for wheat, rice, sugar and kerosene (separately for
urban and rural areas). We combine the PDS shares of wheat and rice by taking
a weighted average using relative shares in consumption for each fractile. (For
example, the weight of rice is determined by taking the expenditure on rice divided
by the expenditure on wheat and rice). The data is taken from Table 5C-R
(Page 100) and Table 5C-U (Page 101) from the NSS Report 555 -Value (Rs.)
of consumption of cereals and pulses per person for a period of 30 days for each
fractile class of MPCEMMRP . (MMRP is used here as PDS shares are available
using type 2 data-MMRP approach). The share of subsidy in consumption is
determined by taking a weighted average of shares for bottom 9 fractile classes
(0-75%) for the rural areas and by taking a weighted average of shares for bottom
6 fractile classes (0-50%) for the urban areas. These two values are combined by
using relative shares of agents among the poor.
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 Steady state value of 
 Using the selected parameter values in equation (63), the steady state value of 
turns out to be 47.93% .
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